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Note
KANSAS V. GARCIA: RESTORING HISTORIC STATE POLICE
POWERS IN TRADITIONAL AREAS OF CRIMINAL LAW
ENFORCEMENT
CHANTAE N. SIMMS*
In Kansas v. Garcia,1 the United States Supreme Court addressed
whether the Immigration Reform and Control Act (“IRCA”)2 preempts states
from prosecuting unauthorized aliens3 for identity theft based on false
information found in federal and state tax-withholding forms, when the same
information is also contained on a federal work-authorization form (“I-9
form”).4 The Court held that the IRCA does not preempt such state
prosecutions.5 Ultimately, the Court correctly decided the case, as federalism
favors deference to the historic police powers of the states in a traditional
area of criminal law.6 Further, the Court interpreted the relevant provisions

© 2021 Chantae N. Simms.
*J.D. Candidate, 2022, University of Maryland Francis King Carey School of Law. The author
wishes to thank the editors and staff of the Maryland Law Review, particularly Jamy Klotzbach,
Brandon Wharton, Monica Kulkarni, and Lydia Jines, for their thoughtful comments, edits, and
encouragement throughout the writing process. The author would also like to thank Professors Max
Stearns, Richard Boldt, and Mark Graber for their guidance, advice, and feedback on earlier drafts
of this Note. Finally, the author thanks her family and friends for their unwavering support and
patience not only during this process, but throughout law school.
1. 140 S. Ct. 791 (2020).
2. Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99–603, 100 Stat. 3359.
3. The author recognizes that the term “alien” has long been considered a dehumanizing term
to describe undocumented persons. Currently, efforts are being made to move away from using the
term, including a movement to eliminate the term from United States immigration laws and replace
it with the word “noncitizen.” See Nicole Acevedo, Biden Seeks to Replace ‘Alien’ with Less
‘Dehumanizing Term’ in Immigration Laws, NBC NEWS (Jan. 22, 2021, 3:34 PM),
https://www.nbcnews.com/news/latino/biden-seeks-replace-alien-less-dehumanizing-termimmigration-laws-n1255350. However, because the term “alien” is used by the United States
Supreme Court in Garcia as well as Title 8 of the United States Code, this Note will use the term
“alien” for purposes of consistency.
4. 8 C.F.R. § 274a.2(a)(2) (2019) (establishing the I-9 form). The I-9 form is a federal form
used to “verify the identity and employment authorization of individuals hired for employment in
the United States.” U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services, I-9, Employment Eligibility
Verification, https://www.uscis.gov/i-9 (last modified May 19, 2020). Both employers and
employees are required to complete the form. 8 C.F.R. § 274a.2(a)(3) (2019).
5. Garcia, 140 S. Ct. at 804, 806.
6. See infra Section IV.B.
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of the IRCA to prevent a construction that would produce absurd results,7 and
the Court avoided inappropriate “judicial guesswork”8 into legislative
intentions.9
I. THE CASE
In August 2012, following a routine traffic stop, Kansas authorities
contacted the restaurant where Ramiro Garcia worked to obtain his
employment application.10 A joint state-federal investigation revealed that
the Social Security number Garcia used on his I-9 form, federal taxwithholding form (“W-4 form”), and state tax-withholding form (“K-4
form”) belonged to a Texas woman.11 As a result, Garcia was charged with
identity theft under Kansas law.12 Prior to trial, Garcia, relying on the IRCA’s
express preemption provision,13 successfully moved to suppress the I-9 form
that he filled out during the hiring process.14 Next, Garcia moved to suppress
the W-4 form, arguing that “the information contained on the I-9 [form] was
transferred to [the] W-4 form.”15 But the district court refused to suppress
the W-4 form.16 Thus, the W-4 and K-4 forms—both containing the same
fraudulent Social Security number—were admitted into evidence.17 Garcia
was subsequently found guilty of identity theft.18
Similarly, a joint state-federal investigation of Donaldo Morales
revealed that Morales had used a Social Security number belonging to
another person on his I-9, W-4, and K-4 forms when he applied for work at
a Kansas restaurant.19 While the State agreed not to rely on the I-9 form as a
basis for prosecution, the tax-withholding forms were admitted into

7. See infra Section IV.C.
8. Garcia, 140 S. Ct. at 808 (Thomas, J., concurring).
9. See infra Section IV.D.
10. State v. Garcia, 401 P.3d 588, 590 (Kan. 2017), rev’d, 140 S. Ct. 791 (2020).
11. Id.
12. Id.; see KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-6107(a)(1) (2019) (criminalizing “using . . . any personal
identifying information . . . belonging to or issued to another person, with the intent to . . . [d]efraud
that person, or anyone else, in order to receive any benefit”).
13. See 8 U.S.C. § 1324a(b)(5) (limiting the use of the I-9 form and “any information contained
in or appended to” the form “for purposes other than” enforcing the IRCA and other specified
provisions of federal law).
14. Garcia, 401 P.3d at 590.
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. Id. at 591.
18. Id.
19. State v. Morales, 401 P.3d 155, 156 (Kan. 2017), rev’d, 140 S. Ct. 791 (2020).
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evidence.20 Consequently, Morales was charged and convicted of identity
theft and making false information.21
Finally, Guadalupe Ochoa-Lara became the focus of an investigation
after officers determined that he had used a Social Security number issued to
another individual to lease an apartment in Kansas.22 Officers subsequently
contacted the restaurant where Ochoa-Lara worked and reviewed his
completed I-9 and W-4 forms, which included the same false Social Security
number.23 The I-9 form was not used to prosecute Ochoa-Lara, but the W-4
form was admitted into evidence.24 Ochoa-Lara was then found guilty of
state identity theft.25
The Kansas Supreme Court reversed Garcia’s conviction, holding that
state prosecutions for identity theft based on fraudulent documents that
include the same false information found in an unauthorized alien’s I-9 form
are expressly preempted by the IRCA. 26 The court concluded that the plain
language of Section 1324a(b)(5) expressly preempted the use of the I-9 form
and “any information contained in” the form for purposes other than those
listed in the provision. 27 Because the fraudulent Social Security number
contained in Garcia’s tax-withholding forms also appeared on his I-9 form,
the court found the State’s argument that it had not actually relied on the I-9
form irrelevant.28
Concurring, Justice Luckert agreed that Section
1324a(b)(5) preempted Garcia’s prosecution, but through the doctrines of
field and conflict preemption rather than express preemption.29
20. Id.
21. Id.; see KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-5824 (2019) (criminalizing, among other things, “making,
generating, distributing or drawing . . . any written instrument . . . with knowledge that such
information falsely states or represents some material matter . . . and with intent to defraud, obstruct
the detection of a theft or felony offense or induce official action”).
22. State v. Ochoa-Lara, 401 P.3d 159, 160 (Kan. 2017), rev’d, 140 S. Ct. 791 (2020).
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. Id. at 161.
26. State v. Garcia, 401 P.3d 588, 599–600 (Kan. 2017), rev’d, 140 S. Ct. 791 (2020).
27. Id. at 599. The IRCA limits the use of the I-9 form and “any information contained in or
appended to” the form to enforcement of the INA and a handful of other federal statutes, including
18 U.S.C. § 1001 (false statements), § 1028 (identity theft), § 1546 (immigration-document fraud),
and § 1621 (perjury). 8 U.S.C. § 1324a(b)(5).
28. Garcia, 401 P.3d at 599.
29. Id. at 600 (Luckert, J., concurring). Unlike express preemption, field and conflict
preemption do not require statutory language explicitly prohibiting states from enacting or enforcing
a specified type of law. Id. Instead, field preemption occurs when Congress occupies a regulatory
field through comprehensive legislation, clearly intending for the field to be regulated exclusively
by the federal government. 1 JACOB A. STEIN, GLEN A. MITCHELL, ET AL., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
§ 2.02 (Matthew Bender ed., 2020). Conflict preemption arises where “it is impossible for a party
to comply with both federal and state requirements” or when a state law operates as an obstacle to
the implementation of a federal statutory scheme. Id. Whereas the majority found express
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Based on its holding in State v. Garcia,30 the court also reversed the
convictions of Morales and Ochoa-Lara.31 The United States Supreme Court
granted certiorari to address whether the IRCA preempts state prosecutions
of unauthorized aliens who use false identities on tax-withholding forms
when the same fraudulent information also appears in an I-9 form.32
II. LEGAL BACKGROUND
The United States Constitution makes clear the federal government’s
supremacy in the field of foreign affairs, including its power over
immigration, naturalization, and deportation of aliens. 33 When the federal
government promulgates “by treaty or statute . . . established rules and
regulations touching the rights, privileges, obligations or burdens of
aliens . . . the treaty or statute is the supreme law of the land.”34 Pursuant to
the Supremacy Clause, when Congress acts within its enumerated authority,
it has the power to preempt state law.35 To implement the Supremacy Clause,
the Supreme Court has developed various preemption principles that are
relevant to the Court’s Garcia decision.36 Section II.A discusses the
enactment of the Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”), the precursor to
the IRCA.37 Section II.B describes the framework of the IRCA and its
employment verification system.38 Section II.C explains the contours of
preemption doctrine.39 Finally, Section II.D explores the approaches taken
by other state and lower federal courts regarding preemption questions
involving aliens prosecuted for using false information and documents in
employment-related contexts.40
preemption language in 8 U.S.C. § 1324a(b)(5), Justice Luckert observed no explicit language in
the statute preempting state civil or criminal proceedings against employees. Garcia, 401 P.3d at
600–01 (Luckert, J., concurring).
30. 401 P.3d 588 (Kan. 2017).
31. State v. Morales, 401 P.3d 155, 157 (Kan. 2017), rev’d, 140 S. Ct. 791 (2020); State v.
Ochoa-Lara, 401 P.3d 159, 161 (Kan. 2017), rev’d, 140 S. Ct. 791 (2020).
32. Kansas v. Garcia, 140 S. Ct. 791, 797 (2020).
33. Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 62 (1941); see U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4 (“The
Congress shall have Power . . . [t]o establish an uniform [sic] [r]ule of [n]aturalization . . . .”).
34. Hines, 312 U.S. at 62–63.
35. Arizona v. United States, 567 U.S. 387, 399 (2012); see U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2 (providing
that federal law “shall be the supreme [l]aw of the [l]and; and the [j]udges in every [s]tate shall be
bound thereby, any [t]hing in the Constitution or [l]aws of any [s]tate to the [c]ontrary
notwithstanding”).
36. State v. Martinez, 896 N.W.2d 737, 746 (Iowa 2017) (citing Fid. Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n
v. de la Cuesta, 458 U.S. 141, 152 (1982)).
37. See infra Section II.A.
38. See infra Section II.B.
39. See infra Section II.C.
40. See infra Section II.D.
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A. The Enactment of the INA
The INA is the foundation of the United States’ immigration and
naturalization laws.41 The INA is a “comprehensive federal statutory scheme
for regulation of immigration and naturalization,” which sets “the terms and
conditions of admission to the country and the subsequent treatment of aliens
lawfully in the country.”42 The INA “provides criteria by which
‘aliens’ . . . may enter, visit and reside in the country.”43 Moreover, the INA
sets forth the “sole and exclusive procedure for determining whether an
alien” should be admitted to or removed from the United States.44 As
originally enacted, employment of illegal entrants was a “peripheral concern”
of the INA, and the Supreme Court originally held that states were not
precluded from regulating the employment of aliens pursuant to their police
powers.45
B. The Enactment of the IRCA and the Requirements of its Employment
Verification System
In 1986, Congress supplemented the INA by enacting the IRCA, which
established a comprehensive scheme that “made combating the employment
of illegal aliens” in the United States “central to ‘[t]he policy of immigration
law.’”46 The major purpose of enacting the IRCA was to regain control over
the Nation’s borders.47 Congress concluded that “[t]he primary incentive for
illegal immigration is the availability of [employment in the United
States].”48 To reduce this incentive, the IRCA imposes sanctions on
employers who knowingly hire unauthorized aliens.49 According to the
41. Immigration and Nationality Act, Pub. L. 414, 66 Stat. 163 (1952), amended by Act of Oct.
3, 1965, Pub. L. 89-236, 79 Stat. 911 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 8 U.S.C.).
42. De Canas v. Bica, 424 U.S. 351, 353, 359 (1976), superseded by statute, 8
U.S.C. § 1324a(h)(2).
43. State v. Martinez, 896 N.W.2d 737, 743 (Iowa 2017) (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(3)).
44. Id. at 744 (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(a)(3)).
45. De Canas, 424 U.S. at 360, 362. Police powers describe the states’ authority to enact laws
that protect the health, safety, morals, and welfare of their citizens. See Santiago Legarre, The
Historical Background of the Police Power, 9 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 745, 793–94 (2007) (“[I]nsofar
as the expression is used in American constitutional law, the phrase ‘police power’ normally refers
to the authority of the states for the promotion of public health, public safety, public morals, and
public welfare.”).
46. Hoffman Plastic Compounds, Inc. v. NLRB, 535 U.S. 137, 147 (2002) (alteration in
original) (quoting INS v. Nat’l Ctr. for Immigrants’ Rts., Inc., 502 U.S. 183, 194 (1991)).
47. 131 CONG. REC. 23,317 (1985); 52 Fed. Reg. 16,205 (May 1, 1987) (“[The IRCA], the most
comprehensive reform of our immigration laws since the enactment of the [INA] in 1952, reflects a
resolve to strengthen law enforcement to control illegal immigration.”).
48. 131 CONG. REC. 23,317 (1985); S. REP. NO. 99-132, at 1 (1985); see also H.R. REP. NO.
99-682, pt. 1, at 46 (1986) (“Employment is the magnet that attracts aliens here illegally . . . .”).
49. 131 CONG. REC. 23,317 (1985).

468

MARYLAND LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 80:463

House Committee on the Judiciary, imposing sanctions would deter
employers from hiring unauthorized aliens, which in turn would deter aliens
from entering the country illegally in search of employment. 50 Further, the
Committee explained that Congress intended for the IRCA to preempt only
a narrow class of state laws—those providing for “civil fines and/or criminal
sanctions on the hiring, recruitment or referral of undocumented aliens.”51
Accordingly, the IRCA established an “employment verification
system” to curtail the employment of unauthorized aliens.52 Using the I-9
form, “employer[s] must attest under penalty of perjury” that they “‘verified
that [an employee] is not an unauthorized alien’” after reviewing approved
documents, such as an employee’s United States passport or resident alien
card.53 Employers who violate the IRCA may face civil and/or criminal
penalties.54 However, states are expressly preempted from “imposing civil
or criminal sanctions (other than through licensing and similar laws)” against
employers who hire unauthorized aliens.55
The IRCA also imposes duties on employees, requiring employees to
“attest” on the I-9 form that they are lawfully able to work in the United
States.56 The IRCA does not impose criminal sanctions on aliens who seek
or engage in unauthorized work, and the Supreme Court has held that states
are impliedly preempted from criminalizing such conduct.57 But the IRCA
does impose civil and criminal penalties on aliens who commit document
fraud to show authorization to work.58
Finally, the IRCA limits the use of “any information contained in or
appended to” an I-9 form for purposes other than enforcing the IRCA and
other specified provisions of federal law.59 The IRCA also limits the use of

50. H.R. REP. NO. 99-682, pt. 1, at 46 (1986). The Committee explained that it was convinced
that imposing employer sanctions was “the most humane, credible and effective way to respond to
the large-scale influx of undocumented aliens.” Id.
51. Id. at 58.
52. Hoffman Plastic Compounds, Inc. v. NLRB, 535 U.S. 137, 147 (2002).
53. Chamber of Com. v. Whiting, 563 U.S. 582, 589 (2011) (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1324a(b)(1)(A)–
(D)).
54. 8 U.S.C. § 1324a(e)(4)(A), (f)(1). Depending on the number of previous violations, an
employer who violates the IRCA shall be ordered to pay a civil fine ranging from $250 to $10,000
for each unauthorized worker with respect to whom a violation occurred. Id. § 1324a(e)(4)(A). In
terms of criminal penalties, employers who engage in a pattern of violations shall be fined up to
$3,000 for each undocumented employee and imprisoned for up to six months. Id. § 1324a(f)(1).
55. Id. § 1324a(h)(2).
56. Id. § 1324a(b)(2).
57. Arizona v. United States, 567 U.S. 387, 403–07 (2012).
58. 8 U.S.C. §§ 1324c(a)(1)–(4), (d)(3), 1546(b).
59. Id. § 1324a(b)(5).
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the employment verification system, more broadly, for “law enforcement
purposes” other than enforcing the IRCA and its provisions.60
C. The Development of the Various Preemption Doctrines
The United States Supreme Court has established two categories of
preemption: express and implied.61 Express preemption occurs when a
statute’s text clearly states that congressional authority is exclusive,62 while
implied preemption involves drawing inferences as to congressional intent
from the entirety of a legislative act.63 The Court recognizes two types of
implied preemption: field and conflict.64
Field preemption arises when either “the scheme of federal regulation
[is] so pervasive . . . that Congress left no room for the [s]tates to supplement
it” or where “the federal interest is so dominant that the federal system will
be assumed to preclude enforcement of state laws on the same subject.”65 For
example, in addition to immigration, the Supreme Court has held that
Congress has occupied the field of aircraft noise regulation “insofar as it
involves controlling the flight of aircraft.”66 In City of Burbank v. Lockheed
Air Terminal, Inc.,67 the City Council of Burbank, California, in an attempt
to reduce airport noise, adopted an ordinance making it unlawful for a “pure
jet aircraft” to take off from a local airport between the hours of 11:00 P.M.
and 7:00 A.M.68 Both the federal trial court and the United States Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit found the ordinance unconstitutional on
Supremacy Clause grounds, and the Supreme Court affirmed.69 Although it
found no express preemption provision in the Federal Aviation Act of 1958
as amended, the Court explained that the “pervasive nature of the scheme of
federal regulation of aircraft noise” supported a conclusion of preemption. 70
Further, the Court recognized that the Act requires a “delicate balance
between safety and efficiency . . . and the protection of persons on the
60. Id. § 1324a(d)(2)(F).
61. Fid. Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. de la Cuesta, 458 U.S. 141, 152–53 (1982).
62. Jones v. Rath Packing Co., 430 U.S. 519, 525 (1977).
63. See id. (explaining preemption “is compelled [where] Congress’[s] command
is . . . implicitly contained in [a statute’s] structure and purpose”).
64. Oneok, Inc. v. Learjet, Inc., 575 U.S. 373, 376–77 (2015).
65. Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947).
66. City of Burbank v. Lockheed Air Terminal, Inc., 411 U.S. 624, 633–35 (1973) (quoting
Letter from Alan S. Boyd, Sec’y of Transp., to Senate Comm. on Com. (June 22, 1968)).
67. 411 U.S. 624 (1973).
68. Id. at 625–26.
69. Id. at 626.
70. Id. at 628–633 (describing how the Noise Control Act of 1972 amended the Federal
Aviation Act to vest exclusive federal control over aircraft noise in the Federal Aviation
Administration and Environmental Protection Agency).
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ground.”71 As such, the Court reasoned that these factors were so
interdependent as to require a “uniform and exclusive system of federal
regulation,” leaving “no room for local curfews or . . . controls.”72
On the other hand, conflict preemption arises when either “compliance
with both federal and state regulations is a physical impossibility” 73 or when
a state law “stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the
full purposes and objectives of Congress.”74 For example, in Crosby v.
National Foreign Trade Council,75 the Supreme Court relied on obstacle
preemption to invalidate Massachusetts’s Burma law.76 There, the state law
barred state agencies from purchasing goods or services from companies
doing business with Burma. 77 Three months after the law was enacted,
Congress adopted a statute imposing federal sanctions on Burma.78 The
federal statute also authorized the President to impose additional sanctions or
waive sanctions, subject to certain conditions.79 Further, the federal statute
directed the President to develop a comprehensive and multilateral strategy
addressing democracy, human rights practices, and the quality of life in
Burma.80 Applying obstacle preemption principles, the Court held that the
Massachusetts law was “an obstacle to the accomplishment of Congress’s
full objectives under the federal Act.”81 The Court explained that Congress
went to great lengths “to provide the President with flexible and effective
authority over economic sanctions against Burma.”82 Moreover, the Court
determined that Congress intended to limit the economic pressure on the
Burmese government to a precise range.83 Yet the Massachusetts law used
different economic leverage, penalizing conduct that Congress specifically
exempted or excluded from sanctions.84 Finally, the Court found that the
71. Id. at 638–39.
72. Id.
73. Arizona v. United States, 567 U.S. 387, 399 (2012) (citing Fla. Lime & Avocado Growers,
Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 142–43 (1963)).
74. Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941).
75. 530 U.S. 363 (2000).
76. Id. at 373, 388.
77. Id. at 367.
78. Id. at 368. The statute included three sanctions: (1) a ban on all aid to the Burmese
government, except for humanitarian assistance, counter-narcotics efforts, and promotions of
human rights and democracy; (2) a mandate instructing United States representatives to
international financial institutions to vote against loans or other assistance to or for Burma; and (3)
a restriction on entry visas to Burmese government officials. Id.
79. Id. at 369.
80. Id.
81. Id. at 373.
82. Id. at 374–76.
83. Id. at 377.
84. Id. at 378.
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state law interfered with the President’s ability to speak on behalf of the
United States when dealing with foreign governments.85 For these reasons,
the Court held that the Massachusetts law stood as an obstacle to the
accomplishment of Congress’s full purposes and objectives and, therefore,
was preempted.
D. Other State and Lower Federal Court Treatment of Preemption
Questions Involving Aliens and Identity Theft Laws
Many states have laws prohibiting fraud, forgery, and identity theft. 86
While these statutes are perfect examples of state exercises of police power,
the enactment of the IRCA has caused them to become the subject of
numerous challenges as applied87 to unauthorized aliens seeking
employment.88
Courts have reached opposite conclusions regarding as-applied
challenges to these laws.89 For example, in State v. Diaz-Rey,90 the Missouri
Court of Appeals addressed whether the State was preempted from
prosecuting an unauthorized alien for forgery based on his use of a false
Social Security number on an employment application.91 There, the State
charged Pablo Gilberto Diaz-Rey, an unauthorized employee, with violating
Missouri’s forgery statute by using a false Social Security number on an
employment document.92 Diaz-Rey filed a motion to dismiss, arguing that
based on Arizona v. United States,93 states were prohibited from enacting
laws “making it a misdemeanor for an unauthorized alien to seek or engage
in work,” and that he was being charged with the same conduct.94 The state
85. Id. at 381–82.
86. Kansas v. Garcia, 140 S. Ct. 791, 798 (2020).
87. There are two basic types of preemption challenges: facial and as-applied. Nat’l Inst. of
Family & Life Advocs. v. Becerra, 138 S. Ct. 2361, 2391 (2018) (Breyer, J., dissenting). To prevail
on a facial challenge, a party “must establish that no set of circumstances exists under which the
Act would be valid.” United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 745 (1987). In contrast, to prevail on
an as-applied challenge, a party must demonstrate that a state law is unconstitutional when applied
in the circumstances of their case. Nat’l Inst. of Family & Life Advocs., 138 S. Ct. at 2391 (Breyer,
J., dissenting) (quoting Chicago v. Morales, 527 U.S. 41, 74 (1999) (Scalia, J., dissenting)).
88. See, e.g., Puente Ariz. v. Arpaio, 821 F.3d 1098, 1102 (9th Cir. 2016) (challenging
Arizona’s employment-related identity theft laws for violating the Supremacy Clause); State v.
Martinez, 896 N.W.2d 737, 742 (Iowa 2017) (challenging an alien’s prosecution under Iowa’s
identity theft and forgery statutes).
89. See Martinez, 896 N.W.2d at 751–54 (identifying inconsistent applications of preemption
principles by lower federal courts in cases involving aliens and employment).
90. 397 S.W.3d 5 (Mo. Ct. App. 2013).
91. Id. at 7–8.
92. MO. REV. STAT. § 570.090 (2017).
93. 567 U.S. 387 (2012).
94. Diaz-Rey, 397 S.W.3d at 7–8.
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trial court agreed and dismissed the charges on grounds that the prosecution
was preempted by the IRCA.95 On appeal, the Missouri Court of Appeals
reversed, holding that the forgery prosecution was neither expressly nor
impliedly preempted by federal law.96
In its implied preemption discussion, the court emphasized that where
“it is alleged that preemption applies in an area . . . that has been traditionally
occupied by the states, a preemption review starts with th[e] assumption” that
state police powers are not superseded unless Congress has made its
preemptive intent “clear and manifest.”97 While acknowledging that the
“IRCA provides a comprehensive framework for combating the employment
of illegal aliens,” the court found that the Missouri forgery statute did not
intrude into the employment of unauthorized aliens.98 Further, the court held
that the forgery statute did not conflict with the IRCA, as the forgery statute
did not “criminalize activity that Congress ha[d] decided not to
criminalize.”99 Rather than imposing sanctions on unauthorized aliens for
performing work,100 the statute merely “criminalize[d] the use of inauthentic
writings or items as genuine with knowledge and intent to defraud.”101
On the other hand, the Iowa Supreme Court held that the enforcement
of identity theft and forgery statutes as applied to unauthorized aliens who
commit fraud to obtain employment is preempted by federal law.102 In State
v. Martinez,103 Martha Martinez, an unauthorized alien, was charged with
identity theft and forgery for providing her employer with a fictitious driver’s
license and Social Security card during the hiring process.104 Martinez filed
a motion to dismiss on the basis that the IRCA preempted her prosecution.105
The state trial court denied the motion.106

95. Id.
96. Id. at 8–11. The court determined that the forgery statute was not expressly preempted by
the IRCA “because [the forgery statute] does not sanction those who employ, recruit, or offer for
employment unauthorized aliens.” Id. at 8–9.
97. Id. at 9 (quoting Arizona, 567 U.S. at 400).
98. Id.
99. Id. at 10.
100. See Arizona, 567 U.S. at 405–06 (holding that states may not criminalize unauthorized
aliens for performing work because the IRCA illustrates a deliberate choice by Congress “not to
impose criminal penalties on aliens who seek, or engage in, unauthorized employment”).
101. Diaz-Rey, 397 S.W.3d at 10.
102. State v. Martinez, 896 N.W.2d 737, 754–57 (Iowa 2017).
103. 896 N.W.2d 737 (Iowa 2017).
104. Id. at 741–42.
105. Id. at 742.
106. Id.
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On interlocutory review, the Iowa Supreme Court determined that
Martinez’s prosecution for identity theft107 was field and conflict preempted
by the IRCA.108 With respect to field preemption, the court explained that
“the IRCA establishes a comprehensive regime of criminal, civil, and
immigration related consequences,”109 forming “a system that can work as a
‘harmonious whole.’”110 As such, the court reasoned that “federal
immigration law occupies the field regarding the employment of
unauthorized aliens,” and thus, the State could not prosecute Martinez for
identity theft related to the fraudulent documents she provided to her
employer as an unauthorized alien.111 The court also found that the identity
theft prosecution was conflict preempted, as the prosecution would
“frustrate[] congressional purpose and provide[] an obstacle to the
implementation of federal immigration policy by usurping federal
enforcement discretion” with respect to the employment of unauthorized
aliens.112 Further, the court determined that enforcement of state laws
regulating employment of unauthorized workers would lead to “inconsistent
enforcement . . . undermin[ing] the harmonious whole of national
immigration law.”113
III. THE COURT’S REASONING
In Garcia, the United States Supreme Court addressed whether the
IRCA preempts states from prosecuting aliens for identity theft based on false
information contained in state and federal tax-withholding forms when the
same false information is also contained in an employee’s I-9 form.114 In a
5-4 decision, the Court held that the IRCA does not preempt states from doing
107. The court also determined that the forgery prosecution was preempted because Iowa’s
forgery statute was a “mirror image of federal immigration law, namely 18 U.S.C. § 1546(a).” Id.
at 754.
108. Id. at 755–57.
109. Id. at 755.
110. Id. (quoting Valle Del Sol Inc. v. Whiting, 732 F.3d 1006, 1025 (9th Cir. 2013)).
111. Id. at 755–56.
112. Id. at 756.
113. Id.
114. Kansas v. Garcia, 140 S. Ct. 791, 797 (2020). Under Kansas law, every employer who is
required to withhold federal income tax is also required to withhold state income tax.
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 79-3298 (2019). To let an employer know how much Kansas income tax
should be withheld, an employee should provide his or her employer with a signed K-4 form. See
KAN. DEP’T OF REVENUE, 500518, FORM K-4, EMPLOYEE’S WITHHOLDING ALLOWANCE
CERTIFICATE (2019) (instructing new employees to complete the K-4 form and give it to his or her
employer in order to have Kansas income tax withheld). Additionally, on or before the date on
which an employee commences employment, the employee must provide the employer with a
signed W-4 form for purposes of determining the proper amount of federal income taxes to withhold
from the employee’s pay. 26 C.F.R. § 31.3402(f)(2)-1(a) (2020).
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so.115 Because the respondents invoked all three categories of preemption,116
the Court considered each argument in turn.117
Every member of the Court agreed that nothing in the IRCA expressly
preempts Kansas’s identify theft laws as applied to the respondents.118 The
Court explained that “the mere fact that an I-9 contains an item of
information . . . does not mean that information ‘contained in’ the I-9 is used
whenever [that information] is later employed.”119 The Court reasoned that
such an interpretation would lead to strange results.120 For example, if the
Kansas Supreme Court’s interpretation of Section 1324a(b)(5) were upheld,
once an employee has stated his or her name on an I-9 form, no person could
use that name for any other purpose.121 Thus, the employee’s name could not
be used by a prosecutor in an indictment, an employer cutting a paycheck, or
a family member mailing a birthday card.122 The majority then addressed the
respondents’ reliance on Section 1324a(d)(2)(F)123 as a basis for arguing that
their prosecutions were expressly preempted.124 The Court found this
argument unpersuasive because the IRCA’s employment verification system
and the completion of tax-withholding forms serve different functions in two
entirely different systems.125 Whereas “[t]he sole function of [the federal
employment verification system] is to establish that an employee is not
barred from working in this country due to alienage,” completing and
submitting tax-withholding forms help “to enforce federal and state income
tax laws.”126
Next, the Court turned to the respondents’ implied preemption
arguments.127 The respondents asserted that Congress ousted states from
regulating “the field of fraud on the federal employment verification system”

115. Garcia, 140 S. Ct. at 804, 806.
116. See supra Section II.C (explaining the various types of preemption).
117. Garcia, 140 S. Ct. at 801.
118. Id. at 804, 808.
119. Id. at 803. The Court found the Kansas Supreme Court’s interpretation “contrary to
standard English usage,” explaining that a person does not use information contained in a particular
source unless the person actually makes use of that source. Id. at 802.
120. Id. at 803.
121. Id. at 803.
122. Id.; see also infra Secition IV.C.
123. 8 U.S.C. § 1324a(d)(2)(F) limits the use of the federal employment verification system “for
law enforcement purposes, other than” enforcing the IRCA and the same federal statutes listed in
§ 1324a(b)(5), i.e., 18 U.S.C. § 1001 (false statements), § 1028 (identity theft), § 1546 (immigrationdocument fraud), and § 1621 (perjury).
124. Garcia, 140 S. Ct. at 803; see supra text accompanying note 60.
125. Garcia, 140 S. Ct. at 803–04.
126. Id.
127. Id. at 804.
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or, even more broadly, “the ‘field relating to the federal employment
verification system.’”128 The majority reiterated that the submission of taxwithholding forms are neither part of nor related to the employment
verification system.129 The majority also clarified that complying with the
employment verification system and submitting tax-withholding forms
results in different benefits.130 Furthermore, the majority explained that the
IRCA does not preclude states from regulating information that must be
supplied as a precondition for employment.131
The majority concluded its field preemption analysis by distinguishing
Arizona, finding no similarity to the consolidated case before the Court.132
While federal immigration law exclusively occupies the field of alien
registration,133 the majority stated that federal law has not created a similar
“comprehensive and unified system regarding information that a [s]tate may
require employees to provide.”134
The majority also found no basis for holding that the Kansas statutes
conflicted with federal law.135 First, the majority concluded that it was
possible for employees to comply with both the IRCA and the Kansas
statutes.136 Second, the majority again distinguished Arizona. In Arizona,
the Court inferred from the legislative history of the IRCA “that Congress
made a deliberate choice not to impose criminal penalties on aliens who seek,
or engage in, unauthorized employment;” however, the Court explained that
here, Congress did not decide that unauthorized aliens who use false
identities on tax-withholding forms should be free from criminal
prosecution.137 Rather, Congress made it a crime to use false information on

128. Id. (emphasis in original) (quoting Brief for Respondents at 42, Kansas v. Garcia, 140 S.
Ct. 791 (2020) (No. 17-834), 2019 WL 3776032, at *42).
129. Id. at 805; see supra text accompanying note 126.
130. Garcia, 140 S. Ct. at 805 (“Submitting W-4’s and K-4’s helped respondents get jobs, but
this did not in any way assist them in showing that they were authorized to work in this country.”).
131. Id.
132. Id. at 805–06.
133. See Arizona v. United States, 567 U.S. 387, 400–03 (2012) (explaining that the
comprehensive statutory framework for the registration of aliens demonstrates that Congress has
occupied the field of alien registration); Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 66–67 (1941) (holding
that “where the federal government . . . has enacted a complete scheme of regulation and has therein
provided a standard for the registration of aliens, states cannot . . . conflict or interfere with, curtail
or complement, the federal law, or enforce additional or auxiliary regulations”).
134. Garcia, 140 S. Ct. at 806.
135. Id.
136. Id. In other words, a Kansas employee could truthfully comply with the employment
verification system while refraining from making false information or committing identity theft.
137. Id.
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a W-4 form.138 The majority explained that the mere fact that a state law may
overlap with federal criminal law does not establish a case for preemption.139
Accordingly, the majority rejected both the express and implied
preemption arguments set forth by the respondents.140 The Court concluded
that the State’s prosecutions were not preempted by the IRCA and reversed
and remanded the judgments of the Kansas Supreme Court.141
A. Concurring Opinion of Justice Thomas
In a concurring opinion, Justice Thomas, joined by Justice Gorsuch,
urged the Court to abandon its “purposes and objectives” implied conflict
preemption jurisprudence.142 Justice Thomas argued that the doctrine has no
constitutional basis143 and articulated that the Court must only hold that
federal law preempts state law if the two “directly conflict.”144 Further,
Justice Thomas also expressed skepticism about field preemption,
specifically “as applied in the absence of a congressional command that a
particular field be pre[]empted.”145 However, Justice Thomas conceded that
the majority correctly applied the Court’s field preemption precedents in
Garcia.146
B. Opinion of Justice Breyer, Concurring in Part and Dissenting in
Part
Writing for the dissent, Justice Breyer, joined by Justices Ginsburg,
Sotomayor, and Kagan, concluded that state prosecutions of aliens for using
fraudulent documents to convince their employers that they are eligible to

138. Id. (citing 26 U.S.C. § 7205).
139. Id.
140. Id. at 804, 806.
141. Id. at 807.
142. Id. (Thomas, J., concurring).
143. See id. at 807–08 (refusing to apply the “purposes and objectives” preemption doctrine
because “it is contrary to the Supremacy Clause”). But see Lauren Gilbert, Immigrant Laws,
Obstacle Preemption and the Lost Legacy of McCulloch, 33 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 153, 167
(2012) (discussing historical support for the doctrine of obstacle preemption).
144. Garcia, 140 S. Ct. at 808 (Thomas, J., concurring) (quoting Wyeth v. Levine, 555 U.S. 555,
590 (2009) (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment)). According to Justice Thomas’s “direct
conflict” standard, preemption turns on whether the text of state and federal laws set forth
conflicting commands. Wyeth, 555 U.S. at 590; Gilbert, supra note 143, at 163 n.56 (“Justice
Thomas indicates that a direct conflict can exist not only when state law penalizes what federal law
requires . . . . It may also exist where federal law authorizes a person to engage in certain actions
prohibited by state law.” (citing Wyeth, 555 U.S. at 589–91, 593–95)).
145. Garcia, 140 S. Ct. at 808 n.* (Thomas, J., concurring) (quoting Camps
Newfound/Owatonna, Inc. v. Town of Harrison, 520 U.S. 564, 617 (1997) (Thomas, J., dissenting)).
146. Id.
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work are field preempted.147 The dissent explained that the IRCA makes its
preemptive intent clear by (1) prohibiting states from using the I-9 form and
the federal employment verification system to police work-authorization
fraud, and (2) creating “a comprehensive and unified system to keep track of
who is authorized to work” in this country, leaving no room for state laws to
police work-authorization violations.148 Thus, the dissent reasoned that the
Kansas prosecutions were preempted by the IRCA, as the prosecutions did
exactly what Congress reserved to itself when it enacted the IRCA: “police
fraud committed to demonstrate federal work authorization.” 149 As an
example, the dissent discussed the prosecution of Donaldo Morales and
explained that Kansas’s “theory of guilt was that Morales intended to deceive
his employer” into believing that he was authorized to work so that his
employer, relying on the deception, “would give him a job.” 150 Therefore,
the dissent concluded that Kansas prosecuted Morales for work-authorization
fraud “for the purpose of obtaining employment.”151
IV. ANALYSIS
In Garcia, the Supreme Court held that state prosecutions of
unauthorized aliens for identity theft based on false information found in taxwithholding forms that contain the same information as an I-9 form are not
preempted by the IRCA.152 To begin, this Note does not take the position
that the doctrine of field preemption should be eliminated.153 Rather, this
Note argues that the Court correctly decided the case, as the holding
preserved traditional state police powers where Congress had not clearly
demonstrated an intent to preempt state authority.154 In doing so, the Court
construed the IRCA to avoid absurdity 155 and properly refrained from

147. Id. at 809 (Breyer, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). The dissent also seems to
consider obstacle preemption as a basis for preempting the Kansas prosecutions, and in doing so,
the dissent discussed Arizona. Id. at 809–10. However, the dissent ultimately rested its preemption
argument on field preemption, concluding that the IRCA “occupies the field of policing fraud
committed to demonstrate federal work authorization.” Id. at 810.
148. Id.
149. Id. at 811.
150. Id.
151. Id. However, the dissent explained that “[o]n different facts, there would have been no
preemption.” Id. For example, had Kansas proved that Morales used the false Social Security
number on his tax-withholding forms to induce a different type of reliance or obtain a different type
of benefit, then the “IRCA would [have] permit[ted] the prosecution.” Id.
152. Id. at 804, 806 (majority opinion).
153. See infra Section IV.A.
154. See infra Section IV.B.
155. See infra Section IV.C.
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“judicial guesswork” into congressional purposes not clearly and manifestly
expressed by the IRCA.156
A. Falling Outside the Preempted Field Versus Eliminating Field
Preemption Jurisprudence
Justice Thomas has expressed skepticism towards the Court’s field
preemption jurisprudence.157 To limit its expansive application, Justice
Thomas would not apply field preemption “in the absence of statutory
language expressly requiring it.”158 Other members of the Court have
likewise objected to the scope of the Court’s field preemption
jurisprudence.159 Moreover, some scholars go as far as to urge the Court to
abandon the doctrine altogether.160
This Note does not purport to suggest that the Court should abandon its
field preemption jurisprudence. Even the doctrine’s critics have been willing
to apply it, although, admittedly, their reason for doing so may be influenced
more by stare decisis than on the doctrine’s correctness.161 Nevertheless, this
156. See infra Section IV.D.
157. See, e.g., Garcia, 140 S. Ct. at 808 n.* (Thomas, J., concurring) (“I am . . . skeptical of field
pre-emption . . . .”); Camps Newfound/Owatonna, Inc. v. Town of Harrison, 520 U.S. 564, 616–17
(1997) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (“[F]ield pre-emption is itself suspect, at least as applied in the
absence of a congressional command that a particular field be pre-empted.”). Justice Thomas has
similarly objected to the Court’s obstacle preemption jurisprudence. See, e.g., Garcia, 140 S. Ct. at
808 (Thomas, J., concurring) (criticizing obstacle preemption because it “impermissibly rests on
judicial guesswork about ‘broad federal policy objectives, legislative history, or generalized notions
of congressional purposes that are not contained within the text of federal law’” (quoting Wyeth v.
Levine, 555 U.S. 555, 587 (2009) (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment)); Arizona v. United
States, 567 U.S. 387, 440 (2012) (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (explaining
that obstacle preemption “is inconsistent with the Constitution because it invites courts to engage in
freewheeling speculation about congressional purpose that roams well beyond statutory text”);
Wyeth, 555 U.S. at 587 (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment) (describing obstacle preemption
as “vague” and “potentially boundless” (citing Geier v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 529 U.S. 861, 907
(2000) (Stevens, J., dissenting)).
158. Camps Newfound/Owatonna, Inc., 520 U.S. at 617.
159. See, e.g., Arizona, 567 U.S. at 423 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)
(objecting to the majority’s expansive field preemption approach and arguing that “[i]mplicit ‘field
preemption’ will not do” to eliminate the states’ inherent sovereign power).
160. See, e.g., Stephen A. Gardbaum, The Nature of Preemption, 79 CORNELL L. REV. 767, 811–
12 (1994) (arguing that field preemption is illegitimate); Kimberly K. Asano & Kamaile A. Nichols,
Note, Center for Bio-Ethical Reform, Inc. v. City & County of Honolulu: Demonstrating the Need
to Abandon the Field Preemption Doctrine, 29 U. HAW. L. REV. 501, 502 (2007) (contending that
“the doctrine of field preemption should be abandoned” because it is “impractical in application and
undermines federalism principles”); Erwin Chemerinsky, Empowering States: The Need to Limit
Federal Preemption, 33 PEPP. L. REV. 69, 74–75 (2005) (“I think there should be only two situations
when there is preemption of state law. One is express preemption. The other is when federal law
and state law are mutually exclusive, so it is not possible for somebody to comply with both.”).
161. See, e.g., Kurns v. R.R. Friction Prods. Corp., 565 U.S. 625, 628, 630–38 (2012)
(illustrating Justice Thomas’s application of field preemption in which Justice Scalia joined).
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Note takes the position that Garcia was correctly decided because the Court’s
implied preemption analysis wisely recognized key policy considerations
underlying state police powers and, by doing so, prevented field preemption
from going too far. One need not go so far as to challenge the legitimacy of
the doctrine of field preemption.
B. The Court Properly Recognized the States’ Historic Police Powers
In preemption cases, the Court presumes that the historic police powers
of the states are not superseded by a federal act unless “that was the clear and
manifest purpose of Congress.”162 Criminal law enforcement is a classic
example of a state police power.163 This is because the purpose of state
criminal law enforcement is to protect citizens’ health, safety, morals, and
welfare.164 Since the founding of this country, “criminal law enforcement
has been primarily a responsibility of the [s]tates,” which remains true
today.165 Across the country, identity theft results in devastating financial
loss and emotional distress for its victims.166 State identity theft laws address
162. Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947) (citations omitted). Concern for
federalism favors preservation of traditional state authority over local matters unless Congress has
clearly taken away that authority. Id. at 241 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). While historically the
Supreme Court has discussed this “presumption against preemption,” recent Supreme Court cases
have failed to apply it. Mary J. Davis, Unmasking the Presumption in Favor of Preemption, 53 S.C.
L. REV. 967, 968, 971 (2002). In fact, some scholars have argued that the Court’s analysis in recent
preemption decisions “has, in effect, created a presumption in favor of preemption.” Id. at 971; see
also Erwin Chemerinsky, Empowering States When It Matters: A Different Approach to
Preemption, 69 BROOK. L. REV. 1313, 1315 (2004) (“Contrary to . . . [the Supreme Court’s] homage
to the presumption against preemption, . . . recent Supreme Court preemption cases clearly put the
presumption in favor of preemption.”); Gilbert, supra note 143, at 161 (explaining that there is a
recent, emerging trend for the Court “to no longer explicitly apply the presumption against
preemption, and in some cases, to do exactly the opposite—presume preemption”).
163. United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 618 (2000) (“[W]e can think of no better example
of the police power, which the Founders denied the [n]ational [g]overnment and reposed in the
[s]tates, than the suppression of violent crime and vindication of its victims.”).
164. For example, in Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., two entertainment establishments that wished
to provide “totally nude dancing” sued to enjoin the enforcement of Indiana’s public indecency
statute, which prohibited complete nudity in public places, on the grounds that the statute violated
the First Amendment. 501 U.S. 560, 562–64 (1991). The lower courts agreed with the
entertainment establishments, but the Supreme Court reversed, finding that the Indiana public
indecency statute fell within the scope of the State’s police powers, as the statute “[was] designed
to protect morals and public order.” Id. at 569 (“The traditional police power of the [s]tates is
defined as the authority to provide for the public health, safety, and morals, and [the Court] ha[s]
upheld such a basis for legislation.”).
165. Kansas v. Garcia, 140 S. Ct. 791, 806 (2020).
166. In 2016, of the 17.7 million persons age sixteen or older who experienced one or more
incidents of identity theft resulting in a loss of $1 or more, the losses collectively totaled $17.5
billion. BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, NCJ 251147, Victims of Identity
Theft, 2016 (2019). Additionally, more than a third of victims who spent six months or more
resolving the financial repercussions of identity theft experienced severe emotional distress. Id.
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this growing problem by protecting citizens from the fraudulent use of
personal information.167
The Kansas statutes at issue in Garcia, which protect the health and
safety of citizens within the State from misuse of personal information,
“address conduct . . . ‘deeply rooted in local feeling and responsibility.’”168
Victims of misused personal data by unauthorized employees are directly
harmed and often must spend months attempting to clear their names and
fixing their damaged credit. 169 In the dissent’s view, rather than protecting a
local interest, Kansas’s application of its criminal laws operated to police
violations of the federal employment verification system.170 In reaching its
conclusion, the dissent overlooked important policy considerations and
erroneously relied on Arizona.
In Arizona, the State had enacted the Support Our Law Enforcement and
Safe Neighborhoods Act (“S.B. 1070”).171 As part of the Act, Section 3
imposed a state penalty on aliens for failing to obey federal alien-registration
laws.172 The United States contended that the Arizona law intruded on the
occupied field of alien registration, which Congress left no room for states to
regulate.173 The Supreme Court agreed, explaining that the comprehensive

167. Puente Ariz. v. Arpaio, 821 F.3d 1098, 1106 (9th Cir. 2016). Compare State v. Martinez,
896 N.W.2d 737, 766 (Iowa 2017) (Mansfield, J., dissenting) (“[Identity theft laws] cover certain
categories of fraudulent conduct and operate in an area of traditional state police power.”), with
Buckman Co. v. Plaintiffs’ Legal Comm., 531 U.S. 341, 347 (2001) (“Policing fraud against federal
agencies is hardly ‘a field which the [s]tates have traditionally occupied’ . . . .” (quoting Rice v.
Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947)).
168. Wis. Dep’t of Indus. v. Gould Inc., 475 U.S. 282, 291 (1986) (quoting San Diego Bldg.
Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236, 243–44 (1959)).
169. For example, mother Camber Lybbert, after receiving news from her bank that her threeyear-old daughter’s Social Security number was on file for two credit cards and two auto loans,
spent approximately thirty hours per week for four to five months scrambling to clear up her
daughter’s credit history. John Leland, Immigrants Stealing U.S. Social Security Numbers for Jobs,
Not Profits, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 4, 2006), https://www.nytimes.com/2006/09/04/world/americas/
04iht-id.2688618.html. As it turned out, an illegal immigrant was using the child’s Social Security
number to get a job. Id. Lybbert explained that “[the undocumented worker has] ruined the
innocence of her [daughter’s] Social Security number because when [her daughter] goes to apply
for loans, she’s going to have this history.” Id. Similarly, Los Angeles County police detective
Adrian Flores also became a victim of identity theft and learned that one of the culprits was an
undocumented immigrant working in Utah. Anna Gorman, Theft of Identity Compounds the Crime,
L.A. TIMES, July 9, 2007, at B3. While Flores, “[did not] lose any money . . . his damaged credit
prevented him from buying a house[,] [a]nd the process to clear his name was long and difficult.”
Id.
170. Garcia, 140 S. Ct. at 811 (Breyer, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); see supra
Section III.B.
171. Arizona v. United States, 567 U.S. 387, 393 (2012).
172. Id.
173. Id. at 400 (citing Brief for the United States at 27, 31, Arizona v. United States, 567 U.S.
387 (2012) (No. 11-182), 2012 WL 939048, at *27, *31).
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statutory framework for the registration of aliens demonstrates that Congress
occupies the field of alien registration and that where Congress occupies an
entire field, “even complementary state regulation is impermissible.”174 As
a result, the Court held that Section 3 of S.B. 1070 was preempted by federal
law.175
Yet, the Kansas statutes at issue in Garcia are different from the
challenged provision in Arizona. Notably, in Arizona, the State’s purpose in
enacting S.B. 1070 was to “discourage and deter the unlawful entry and
presence of aliens and economic activity by persons unlawfully present in the
United States.”176 Thus, Section 3 was an attempt to drive out unauthorized
aliens from the State’s borders by enforcing federal alien-registration laws at
the state level and imposing penalties for violations. But, in Garcia, Kansas’s
identity theft and false information statutes, as applied, did not impose
penalties on unauthorized aliens for committing fraud to demonstrate federal
work authorization.
Rather, the Kansas laws and prosecutions imposed criminal sanctions
for stealing personal identifying information belonging to another person.177
Kansas utilized its police powers, not to prosecute unauthorized aliens for
immigration violations, but to address the identity theft problem within its
borders. Indeed, while S.B. 1070 targeted noncitizens, the Kansas statutes
are criminal laws of general applicability, applying to citizens and
noncitizens alike.
That is to say, even if “Congress has
occupied . . . the . . . field of policing fraud committed to demonstrate federal
work authorization[,]” 178 Kansas’s application of its identity theft laws to
unauthorized aliens who use false identities on tax-withholding forms, where
the same information is also contained in an I-9 form, falls outside of that
field. Contrary to the dissent’s assertion that Kansas applied its laws to
prosecute the respondents for misrepresenting their federal work
authorization, the State actually prosecuted the respondents for identity theft
and making false information by fraudulently using other individuals’
information on their tax-withholding forms.
Although conceding that the IRCA has created a comprehensive scheme
whereby Congress has taken from the states the power to police fraud
committed to demonstrate federal work authorization,179 it cannot be said that
174. Id. at 401.
175. Id. at 403.
176. Id. at 393.
177. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-6107(a)(1) (2019).
178. Kansas v. Garcia, 140 S. Ct. 791, 808 (2020) (Breyer, J., concurring in part and dissenting
in part).
179. See 8 U.S.C. § 1324a(b)(5), (d)(2)(F) (limiting the states’ use of the I-9 form and the
employment verification system); 131 CONG. REC. 23,317 (1985) (aiming to reduce the availability
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Congress has similarly demonstrated a clear intent to preempt states from
prosecuting unauthorized aliens for using fraudulent information on
employment-related documents, unrelated to work authorization. Nothing in
the IRCA’s “text, . . . structure, context, [or] purpose”180 alludes to, much
less demonstrates, a “clear and manifest” intent to prohibit states from
applying their laws to prosecute individuals for identity theft or making false
information.
In the absence of a “clear and manifest” intent on the part of Congress
demonstrating that the IRCA should have preemptive effect on specific
applications of state identity theft and making false information laws,
federalism favored upholding historic state police powers.181 To hold
otherwise would be an inappropriate intrusion on the exercise of state police
powers in criminal law enforcement that has historically been conceded to
the states, as well as inconsistent with the federal system.
C. The Court Wisely Interpreted the IRCA to Avoid Absurdity
In preemption analyses, “[c]ongressional purpose is . . . ‘the ultimate
touchstone.’”182 Courts prefer to interpret a statute in a manner that leads to
logical results in order to prevent an absurd meaning the legislature did not
intend.183 However, the Kansas Supreme Court’s interpretation of Section
1324a(b)(5) would result in strange consequences.184 If the United States
Supreme Court had affirmed the Kansas Supreme Court’s interpretation of
the provision, any information “contained in” the I-9 form could not be used
by any person185 for any purpose other than those listed in the provision.186
However, this interpretation would lead to bizarre results.187 For example,
even if an employee truthfully stated his name on an I-9 form, his employer
could neither cut him a paycheck with that name, nor could his sister use his
name to mail him a card.188 Surely Congress did not intend those results.
of employment in the United States to illegal immigrants by establishing an employment
verification system).
180. Garcia, 140 S. Ct. at 808 (Breyer, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
181. Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 241 (1947) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
182. Wis. Dep’t of Indus. v. Gould Inc., 475 U.S. 282, 290 (1986) (citing Allis-Chalmers Corp.
v. Lueck, 471 U.S. 202, 208 (1985)).
183. See Christina Gomez, Canons of Statutory Construction, 46 COLO. LAW., Feb. 2017, at. 23,
25 (“[C]ourts have held that . . . statutes should be construed to avoid absurd results the legislature
could not have intended.”).
184. Garcia, 140 S. Ct. at 803.
185. 8 U.S.C. § 1324a(b)(5) applies not only to states but also to the federal government and
private citizens. Id. at 802.
186. Id. at 800.
187. Id. at 803.
188. Id.
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It may be countered that there is a narrower reading to the Kansas
Supreme Court’s interpretation and that the federal government would not
have an interest in prohibiting individual uses of personal information
“contained in” the I-9 form for the purposes illustrated. Further, the Kansas
Supreme Court itself suggested “that its interpretation applied only to the
prosecution of aliens for using a false identity to establish ‘employment
eligibility.’”189
Nevertheless, that (1) the Kansas Supreme Court’s
interpretation, if read literally, could produce such results, (2) such
limitations are not found within the text of Section 1324a(b)(5),190 and (3) the
structure and purpose of the IRCA (i.e., to combat the employment of illegal
aliens) does not support these broad results, all suggest that the Kansas
Supreme Court’s interpretation is inconsistent with Congress’s intent with
respect to the scope of the limitation provision.
Moreover, the heading of Section 1324a(b)(5), which reads “[l]imitation
on use of attestation form,”191 further supports a finding that Congress did
not express a “clear and manifest” intent to preempt state identity theft
prosecutions with respect to misused personal information by unauthorized
aliens on employment documents. Although “headings are not commanding,
they supply cues” of what Congress intended “to sweep within its reach.”192
Here, “attestation form” refers to the statutory requirement that a prospective
employee attest on the “form designated or established by the Attorney
General,” i.e., the I-9 form,193 that they are authorized to work in the United
States, and that an employer attest on the same form that they have reviewed
the requisite document(s) produced by the prospective employee.194 Thus,
the language “[l]imitation on use of attestation form” cannot reasonably be
understood to indicate a congressional intent to limit a state’s use of taxwithholding forms. If Congress did in fact intend to expressly preempt states
from using fraudulent tax-withholding forms as the basis for prosecuting
unauthorized aliens, it used the most inconspicuous language to do so. As
such, the most appropriate reading of Section 1324a(b)(5) is that Congress
intended to create a “use limitation” on the I-9 form rather than a sweeping
“information-use preemption.”195

189. Id. (quoting State v. Garcia, 401 P.3d 588, 596 (Kan. 2017)).
190. Id.
191. 8 U.S.C. § 1324a(b)(5).
192. Yates v. United States, 574 U.S. 528, 540 (2015).
193. 8 C.F.R. § 274a.2(a)(2) (2019) (establishing the I-9 form).
194. 8 U.S.C. § 1324a(b)(1)(A)–(D), (2).
195. Brief for the Petitioner at 28, Kansas v. Garcia, 140 S. Ct. 791 (2020) (No. 17-834), 2019
WL 2296765, at *28 (quoting State v. Garcia, 401 P.3d 588, 604 (Kan. 2017) (Biles, J., dissenting),
rev’d, 140 S. Ct. 791 (2020)).
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Lastly, the Kansas statutes are neutral, applying to both aliens and
United States citizens. Had the United States Supreme Court affirmed the
holding of the Kansas Supreme Court, only United States citizens could be
prosecuted by states for using fraudulent tax-withholding documents
containing the same information as found in an I-9 form. Unauthorized aliens
would be immune from prosecution for the same conduct—only held
accountable at the whim of the federal government.196 Although this
observation rings true whenever federal law preempts state law, such an
outcome would have been inappropriate in Garcia where the State utilized
its police powers to address a local problem. This is because the State would
be rendered unable to fully eliminate an inherently local injury, unrelated to
any federal policy.197
D. The Court Rightly Refrained from “Judicial Guesswork” Following
Arizona
When a federal act contains an express preemption clause, the Court
focuses on the plain language of that clause as evidence of congressional
intent.198 While preemption analysis requires ascertaining congressional
intent, the Court has said that legislative history, alone, is insufficient to
establish preemptive intent.199 Moreover, the Court has explained that
“unenacted approvals, beliefs, and desires are not laws.”200 Rather, the Court
has consistently looked to the text of federal statutes as the principal authority
for finding, or not finding, a basis for preemption.201
196. State v. Martinez, 896 N.W.2d 737, 761 (Iowa 2017) (Mansfield, J., dissenting).
197. See supra Section IV.B.
198. Chamber of Com. v. Whiting, 563 U.S. 582, 594 (2011); see also Gomez, supra note 183,
at 23 (“[T]he starting point in construing a statute . . . is the plain meaning of the text.”).
199. P.R. Dep’t of Consumer Affairs v. Isla Petrol. Corp., 485 U.S. 495, 501 (1988); see also
Whiting, 563 U.S. at 599 (“Congress’s ‘authoritative statement is the statutory text, not the
legislative history.’” (citing Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Allapattah Servs., Inc., 545 U.S. 546, 568
(2005))).
200. Isla Petrol. Corp., 485 U.S. at 501. At the same time, this is not the view taken by every
judge or legal scholar and remains a massive debate in statutory interpretation. Compare, e.g., John
F. Manning, What Divides Textualists from Purposivists?, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 70, 76–77, 102,
105, 111 (2006) (arguing that the purposivist approach to statutory interpretation, which gives
priority to policy context, completely ignores the legislative process and makes it difficult for
legislators to articulate boundary lines for legislation, because political minorities cannot rely upon
the statutory text “as a predictable means for setting the desirable limits on bills” they are only
willing to assent to “upon the acceptance of bargained-for conditions”), with Daniel J. Meltzer,
Preemption and Textualism, 112 MICH. L. REV. 1, 7, 57 (2013) (defending purposivist statutory
interpretation on the grounds that it is necessary to “the task of fashioning a workable legal system”).
However, it is beyond the scope of this Note to resolve this ongoing scholarly debate.
201. See Isla Petrol. Corp., 485 U.S. at 501 (upholding the tax and regulation on the grounds
that there was no enacted statutory text to support a preemptive intent); see also Whiting, 563 U.S.
at 594–95, 598 (finding that the IRCA expressly preserves the states’ ability to impose sanctions

2021]

KANSAS V. GARCIA

485

For example, in Chamber of Commerce v. Whiting,202 the Court intently
focused on the language of the savings clause203 within the express
preemption provision of Section 1324a(h)(2).204 Based on its plain text, the
Court concluded that an Arizona law allowing Arizona courts to suspend or
revoke business licenses of employers who knowingly or intentionally hire
unauthorized aliens was not preempted by the IRCA.205 Furthermore, in
Puerto Rico Department of Consumer Affairs v. Isla Petroleum Corp.,206 the
Court upheld regulations on gasoline and petroleum products enacted by the
Puerto Rico Department of Consumer Affairs on the grounds that there was
absolutely no text to attach a preemptive intent of a federally mandated freemarket.207
However, in Arizona, the Court diverged from its previous rulings
regarding a federal act’s legislative history and solely relied on the legislative
history of the IRCA as the basis for striking down a state law.208 Such a
divergence is problematic, as “[u]nder the Supremacy Clause, pre-emptive
effect is to be given to congressionally enacted laws, not to judicially divined
legislative purposes.”209 It is sheer guesswork for a court to attempt to
through licensing laws on employers of unauthorized workers); Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp.,
331 U.S. 218, 233 (1947) (holding that the text of the amended United States Warehouse Act clearly
gave exclusive authority to the Secretary of Agriculture over persons licensed under the Act).
202. 563 U.S. 582 (2011).
203. Black’s Law Dictionary defines a “saving[s] clause” as “[a] statutory provision exempting
from coverage something that would otherwise be included.” Saving clause, BLACK’S LAW
DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019). Accordingly, although Congress has restricted the states’ ability to
combat the employment of unauthorized workers, the IRCA includes a savings clause, or exception,
for sanctions imposed “through [state] licensing and similar laws.” 8 U.S.C. § 1324a(h)(2) (2018).
As such, Congress explicitly saved the states’ power to enforce “licensing and similar laws” against
employers of unauthorized aliens, which would otherwise have been preempted.
204. Whiting, 563 U.S. at 594–96; see 8 U.S.C. § 1324a(h)(2) (“[T]his section preempt[s] any
[s]tate or local law imposing civil or criminal sanctions (other than through licensing and similar
laws) upon those who employ, or recruit or refer for a fee for employment, unauthorized aliens.”).
205. Whiting, 563 U.S. at 599.
206. 485 U.S. 495 (1988).
207. Id. at 501, 503.
208. As part of S.B. 1070, § 5(C) made it a misdemeanor for “an unauthorized alien ‘to
knowingly apply for work, solicit work in a public place or perform work as an employee or
independent contractor’” in the State of Arizona. Arizona v. United States, 567 U.S. 387, 403
(2012) (quoting ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-2928(C) (2010)). While the IRCA imposes sanctions
on employers who knowingly employ unauthorized aliens or fail to comply with the employment
verification system, 8 U.S.C. § 1324a(a)(1), it is silent as to whether additional penalties may be
imposed against employees, Arizona, 567 U.S. at 406. Ultimately, the Court held that the “Arizona
law would interfere with the careful balance struck by Congress with respect to unauthorized
employment of aliens.” Id. The Court explained that “[t]he legislative background of [the] IRCA
underscores the fact that Congress made a deliberate choice not to impose criminal penalties on
aliens who seek, or engage in, unauthorized employment” and that the states could not make
criminal what Congress did not. Id. at 405–06.
209. Arizona, 567 U.S. at 440 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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decipher the subjective thoughts motivating the members of Congress at the
moment they adopt or reject a bill or provision. For example, Congress’s
rejection of a provision including criminal penalties for employees in Arizona
could have also been reasonably understood as the antithesis.210
In Garcia, the Court properly refrained from such “judicial
guesswork.”211 Similar to Congress’s silence regarding whether states may
impose additional penalties on unauthorized employees in Arizona, the IRCA
regulates the use of the I-9 form and appended documents but says nothing
about the use of other documents for law enforcement purposes.212 The
Garcia court did not engage in “atextual speculation about legislative
intentions,”213 and instead rightly upheld the Kansas statutes.
It may be urged that the Court’s absurdity analysis in Garcia is itself
“judicial guesswork.”214 However, highlighting and rejecting the bizarre
potential consequences of the Kansas Supreme Court’s interpretation of
Section 1324a(b)(5) is a far cry from a “freewheeling”215 speculation into
congressional purposes.
Certainly, when presented with a state’s
interpretation of a federal statute, one cannot expect the Court to forego all
common sense and understanding of English language conventions in
ascertaining its meaning.
V. CONCLUSION
In Garcia, the Supreme Court held that the IRCA does not preempt
states from prosecuting unauthorized aliens for identity theft or other similar
statutes based on false information found in documents independent of the I9 form.216 The Court correctly decided the case because the holding
preserves historic state police powers in a traditional area of criminal law
enforcement where Congress lacked a “clear and manifest” purpose to
preempt.217 By rejecting the interpretation of the Kansas Supreme Court, the
210. Id. at 433 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“There is no more reason to
believe that this rejection was expressive of a desire that there be no sanctions on employees, than
expressive of a desire that such sanctions be left to the [s]tates.”); see also supra note 200
(discussing legislative compromise).
211. See Kansas v. Garcia, 140 S. Ct. 791, 808 (2020) (Thomas, J., concurring) (arguing that
“‘purposes and objectives’ pre-emption impermissibly rests on judicial guesswork about ‘broad
federal policy objectives, legislative history, or generalized notions of congressional purposes that
are not contained within the text of federal law’”) (quoting Wyeth v. Levine, 555 U.S. 555, 587
(2009) (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment)).
212. Id. at 798 (majority opinion).
213. Id. at 808 (Thomas, J., concurring).
214. Id.; see supra Section IV.C.
215. Wyeth, 555 U.S. at 604 (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment).
216. Garcia, 140 S. Ct. at 804, 806.
217. See supra Section IV.B.
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Court properly construed the IRCA to prevent strange and absurd results
from occurring.218 Finally, the Court refrained from inquiring solely into
congressional purposes outside of the IRCA’s text after deviating off course
in Arizona.219

218. See supra Section IV.C.
219. See supra Section IV.D.

